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INTRODUCTION
The Detection and Punishment of
Tacit Collusion
Introduction by Mr. Michael Freed
My name is Michael Freed. I am an attorney
in private practice in Chicago. My practice is in
the antitrust area, and it is my pleasure to intro-
duce the panel for the first panel discussion this
afternoon. For those of you who were here this
morning, you know the morning discussion was
about the proper goals of antitrust, particularly
the intersection of the public and the private in-
terests. The third panel's topic is related to is-
sues involving the U.S. antitrust laws in the glo-
bal market. These are both somewhat abstract
matters.
I think this panel's topic is perhaps more prag-
matic in the practical experience. It is the detec-
tion and punishment of tacit collusion. The panel
is representative of a broad section of attorneys
involved in the antitrust area. They include apri-
vate practitioner, mostly on the defense side, a
prominent professor, and the chief of the Civil
Task Force of the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice.
The first panelist to speak will be William
Kovacic. He is a professor of law at the George
Mason University School of Law where he
teaches antitrust contracts, government contracts,
property, quantitative methods for lawyers, and
unfair trade practices. He is also an associate fac-
ulty member with Rutgers University Center for
Research and Regulated Industries, and he is Of
Counsel to the Brian Cave law firm in Washing-
ton, D.C. Just yesterday, I received from Profes-
sor Kovacic a paper entitled, "Antitrust Policy
and Horizontal Collusion of the 21st Century,"
which I understand will be part of the program
of this symposium.
The second panelist to speak will be M. J.
Moltenbrey. She is the chief of the Civil Task
Force at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice. The Civil Task Force is re-
sponsible for major civil antitrust investigations
and litigation, with special emphasis on intellec-
tual property, licensing, joint ventures, vertical
agreements, and trade association activity.
The final speaker will be Nathan Eimer. He is
in private practice doing mostly defense work, a
graduate of Northwestern University and the
University of Illinois. I asked him today where
he went to high school, and he is probably the
only person I know from Mather High School.
He is an adjunct professor of law and trial advo-
cacy and a partner and senior member of the liti-
gation group at Sidley & Austin here in Chicago.
I think that Bill Gotfryd should be commended
in putting together a pretty representative panel.
He left out plaintiff's counsel, but that's okay,
because I see a lot of plaintiff's counsel here in
the audience. They will probably learn more by
listening to the panel than speaking themselves.
Without further ado, I will present our first
speaker, Professor Kovacic.
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Presentation by Professor Kovacic:
I want to first thank the organizers of the pro-
gram for the chance to participate. It's a delight
to be part of such a wonderful group and to have
the chance to talk about a number of especially
interesting and current issues. So my thanks to
Loyola and its broader community.
I am going to be talking a bit about something
that, in a sense, is much more pedestrian than
the opening session today. I am going to talk
about an area of enforcement policy that com-
mands a fairly broad consensus. If you were to
take together, including the contending views
from this morning's segment, I think all of the
panelists there would have agreed that antitrust
prohibition on certain types of agreements among
competitors forms an appropriate and central
focus for antitrust policy. I say that it is an ac-
cepted core with some hesitation because there
is some debate in the academic literature about
whether the prohibition on horizontal collusion
is a good idea.
I remember, with some amusement,
a Cato Institute session that took place William
in the mid-l 980s. Two of the featured Mason
speakers were the Chairman of the trust, ct
Federal Trade Commission, Jim tative m
Miller, and the head of the Antitrust also is
Division, Doug Ginsburg. Both spoke where t
in front of a hard-core Laissez-faire ment c(
audience. The two speakers were bat- 1986, h
tered for being rampaging interven- four ye,
tionists: first, Ginsburg for his hope- editor (
lessly interventionist idea of putting nomics.
business people in jail for horizontal bia Uni
price-fixing and, next, Jim Miller for,
what the audience viewed as foolish, his efforts
to prosecute subtler forms of horizontal collu-
sion. For two men accustomed to being attacked
from the left, it must have come as a shock to be
assaulted from the right. We watched both of
them backpeddle and say, 'no, there is actually a
sensible core here.'
The widely-accepted core can be deceptively
simple and often is a very complex area. It starts
with an issue that Eleanor Fox referred to this
morning. When one goes to a transition economy,
one often finds that a prohibition on collusion is
a standard element of antitrust practice. Transi-
tion economy officials often ask questions such
as, "What is an agreement?"; after you lay out
the conceptual terms, they say, "Fine. How do
you prove an agreement?" You realize, in at-
tempting to answer those very simple straight-
forward questions, how difficult and complex the
resolution of those issues has become in Ameri-
can antitrust jurisprudence.
E. Kovacic is a Professor of Law at the George
University School of Law where he teaches anti-
ontracts, government contracts, property, quanti-
ethods for lawyers, and unfair trade practices. He
Of Counsel to Brian Cave in Washington, D.C.,
e practices with the firm's antitrust and govern-
9ntracts groups. Before joining George Mason in
e was an associate at Brian Cave and worked for
ars at the Federal Trade Commission. He is co-
with Richard Zerbe) ofResearch in Law and Eco-
Professor Kovacic earned his J.D. from Colum-
iversity and his A.B. from Princeton University.
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The campaign against collusion in the United
States is beset by three interesting phenomena
or challenges. The first is the proverbial long-
standing problem of how to distinguish between
unilateral and collective conduct. The definition
of agreement is absolutely fundamental to the
operation of the Sherman Act; but I am going to
assert that it remains one of the most confusing
and perplexing areas of antitrust jurisprudence.
The second challenge or phenomenon deals
with the apparent persistence of significant epi-
sodes of covert illegal collusion among rival pro-
ducers. I find the Archer Daniels Midland epi-
sode to be both fascinating and distressing. At
least since the early 1970s, it has been unmis-,
takably clear that those who engage in horizon-
tal price fixing face a real risk of going to prison.
Certainly in the past decade, with the promulga-
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the sig-
nificant bolstering of criminal penalties for hori-
zontal collusion, the sanctions are especially se-
vere. Individual violators will spend a signifi-
cant amount of time in prison and their compa-
nies will be exposed to significant criminal fines,
in addition to facing the possibility of private
treble damage suits.
It is an article of faith in every compliance an-
titrust program, well established throughout the
corporate community, that if business executives
are going to learn anything, the one antitrust pre-
cept they absorb is 'you cannot discuss or agree
upon prices with your direct rivals.' Notwith-
standing a long process of educating the busi-
ness community on that point, disseminating the
message, ratcheting up the penalties, running
dozens of grand juries a year, we still find a ma-
jor firm that took a breathtaking risk, did so at a
high level of the company, and carried out the
illegal plan over a long period of time. In my
mind, this raises two questions: one, how effec-
tive is the basic set of prohibitions on horizontal
collusion and, two, how many more serious epi-
sodes of such behavior are taking place undetec-
ted because an insider steps forward and provides
direct evidence of collusion.
The third interesting challenge involves the
emergence and refinement of new techniques for
subtle forms of coordination-phenomena rec-
ognized in the academic literature dealing with
oligopolistic coordination and interaction-that
permit firms to engage in coordinated activity
without relying on behavior that crosses clearly
into the red zone. A plain effect of the Sherman
Act over a century or more of experience has
been to drive cartels underground. The Trans-
Missouri Freight (U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897)) collusion case,
which is a fixture of early antitrust jurisprudence,
involved an agreement that the defendants readily
acknowledged. Early horizontal price fixing
agreement cases did not involve covert arrange-
ments. The Sherman Act endangered those agree-
ments and pushed them underground. Firms re-
sponded by developing subtle, covert techniques
for coordinating pricing decisions.
My presentation looks at four separate issues:
The first is the agreement issue. The second is to
suggest ways of expanding the gathering of di-
rect evidence involving collusion. The third is
to emphasize a strategy that involves, apropos
of this morning's discussion, dismantling barri-
ers to entry that tend to stabilize collusion. The
last is to identify institutional approaches for
improving policy guidance and analysis by gov-
ernment agencies in dealing with horizontal col-
lusion.
I want to start with the agreement issue. One
can identify four basic coordination scenarios that
appear in reported opinions dealing with hori-
zontal collaboration. The first involves an express
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exchange of assurances established by direct
evidence of agreement-testimony or documen-
tary records that unmistakably identify the terms
and format of the cooperation. Ordinarily when
direct evidence is discovered, the result is a plea
agreement much like the ADM case. The sec-
ond type of case involves a covert exchange of
assurances, but prosecutors or private plaintiffs
are unable to generate direct evidence of agree-
ment and instead must rely upon circumstantial
proof. A third coordination scenario involves the
use of subtle tactics, which take place in various
channels through which firms signal their inten-
tions, elicit some form of approval or endorse-
ment from their competitors, and then attempt,
through arms-length interaction, to mimic their
rival's moves. This behavior may or may not be
characterized as an agreement for antitrust pur-
poses. Last is pure structural interdependence in
which firms acknowledge their interdependence,
recognize the impact of their pricing moves on
their rivals, but perhaps do not engage in subtle
forms of signaling or other behavior to indicate
future moves.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on agreement
issues has laid out three basic points of refer-
ence. First, the Court has defined an "agreement"
as being a conscious commitment to a common
scheme. The difficulty with the Court's efforts
to define "agreement" is that they could be in-
terpreted to encompass pure oligopolistic inter-
dependence, which has ordinarily been excluded
from the reach Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It
is possible to imagine the mere interaction of
oligopolists being characterized as a conscious
commitment to a common scheme, yet, the broad
formula does not give us useful guidelines for
sorting out the pure interdependent scenario from
the actual exchange of assurances. A second ba-
sic frame of reference is established by the The-
atre Enterprises (Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954)) decision in 1954. In Theatre Enter-
prises, the Supreme Court made clear that if the
plaintiff introduces nothing more than evidence
of parallel adjustments in behavior over time, it
has failed to establish an agreement for Sherman
Act purposes. The plaintiff will be required to
show parallelism plus something else. "Plus fac-
tors" serve as a means for sorting out mere inter-
dependence from concerted action. The last point
of reference is that in the case of circumstantial
evidence, Matsushita (Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986)) has made clear that where the plain-
tiff relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence
and where the defendant succeeds in demon-
strating that an inference of independent action
is as likely as an interference of concerted ac-
tion, summary judgment for the defendant is
warranted. Where circumstantial evidence is
ambiguous and the hypothesis of unilateral con-
duct is as plausible as that of concerted action,
Matsushita indicates that the defendants should
prevail unless the plaintiff steps forward with
additional evidence that tends to establish the
likelihood of concerted action.
What are the weaknesses in these three basic
ingredients of Supreme Court jurisprudence? Let
me simply mention two. The first is the use of
"plus factors." You are familiar with the tradi-
tional litany of plus factors: the existence of a
rational motive to conspire, the presence of be-
havior that is contrary to the defendant's self-
interest unless pursued as part of the common
plan (put another way, a phenomena that cannot
be explained rationally, except as the outcome
of concerted action), communications among ri-
vals or at least the opportunity to communicate,
industry conditions that facilitate or reinforce
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collusion, performance data such as high profit-
ability that suggest successful coordination over
time, and the lack of a plausible business justifi-
cation for the behavior.
What is the problem with how the courts have
applied these factors in collusion decisions? I am
going to describe the typical treatment of agree-
ment issues in court of appeals and district court
opinions. The typical opinion observes conscious
parallelism and turns to the standard menu of plus
factors. The court says that if you find one plus
factor, there is an agreement. There is no discus-
sion about the relative weight that individual fac-
tors on the list deserve. All we need to look for is
one item on the list, and we have an agreement.
Or opinions sometimes say, 'I have got several
items from this list, A, D, E and F here.' The
court realizes it needs something more than just
parallelism. The opinion does not explain the rel-
evance of each factor in pushing the behavior
outside the zone of unilateral conduct. In effect,
the court constructs a black box and does not
explain what is going on inside the black box.
Such opinions lend a degree of impressionism
to district and appellate court decisionmaking in
this area.
One way to explain the opinions is that the
court develops its own intuition about whether
the behavior is concerted or unilateral. If the court
tends to give fairly strong weight to the possibil-
ity of unilateral behavior or believes the com-
petitive interaction between firms is robust, the
court will insist that the plaintiff introduce more
plus factors. By contrast, if the court's underly-
ing intuition is that a covert agreement accounts
for the observed market outcome, then simply
one plus factor will do.
A second basic problem that besets this frame-
work is dealing with behavior that involves subtle
interaction between oligopolists where, for ex-
ample, such firms announce price movements in
advance, await the reactions of competitors, and
respond by either raising prices or making other
adjustments. Here, there may be some conver-
gence on a common set of policies, no conven-
tional direct or covert communications among
rivals, but behavior that might be termed offer
and acceptance.
This situation poses a couple of problems. One
is that if you are going to apply the label of con-
certed conduct to this type of interaction, what
kind of order would you write to define the for-
bidden conduct? What do you tell the firms they
cannot do in the future-that they cannot pay at-
tention to each other, cannot respond in certain
ways? What is the avoidable conduct that firms
must forgo in the future?
Second, in the Matsushita framework where
the plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence,
a fundamental problem may arise if defendants
make the following argument: Matsushita calls
for an economically plausible theory of liability
and requires that the plaintiff's theory of con-
spiracy be economically rational. Modem game
theory teaches us that we can reach basically the
same outcome through arms-length interaction
as we can achieve by sitting in a smoke-filled
home in the hotel. It is irrational for us to try and
do really dangerous things when we simply can
rely on arms-length interaction and get the same
result. This argument may create ambiguity with
respect to the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence.
Courts may view summary judgment as appro-
priate where defendants say, "Yes, we coordi-
nated our behavior, but we did so in a way that is
outside the bounds of Section 1, and you have to
allow the behavior to go ahead. And, oh, yes, if
you are thinking of prohibiting it, what kind of
order will you write to tell us what we cannot
do?"
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A solution that I suggest in the short paper [ac-
companying this presentation] draws upon the
experience with the development of the federal
government's merger guidelines. One of the big
innovations in the 1982, 1984 and 1992 versions
of the merger guidelines has been the use of a
more economically-informed theory of how
firms collaborate to explain how certain merg-
ers can cause competitive harm. I propose a re-
formulation of the agreement requirement to
track the three basic elements of what economists
have concluded firms must do to conspire suc-
cessfully-namely, reach a consensus, detect
cheating, and punish defectors. I propose that
those activities be the focus of analysis in collu-
sion cases and that the evaluation of plus factors
be related to how, each plus factor suggests the
ability of the defendant to do those three things.
The second topic I want to address today is
gathering direct proof of conspiracy. One ap-
proach to solving some of the dilemmas of the
modem agreement doctrine is to redefine the use
of circumstantial proof in the determining the ex-
istence of an agreement. A second solution is to
get more direct evidence of the agreement, in the
form of testimony or documentary records which
show conduct displaying parallelism that actu-
ally did collaborate in enabling a common plan
of action.
One of the most interesting and most remark-
able law enforcement innovations of the mod-
em era has been the amendment in 1986 of the
Civil False Claims Act. As altered in 1986, the
Civil False Claims Act deputizes all employees
of recipients of government funds (e.g., contrac-
tors and grant recipients) to monitor compliance
with government procurement policy on behalf
of the government and to file suits on the
government's behalf where such violations are
detected. A bounty of 15 to 30 percent of all
amounts that the government recovers is paid to
the relator who provided the information that
helped generate the recovery by the government.
The largest bounty to date has been about $40
million for an individual who detected double-
billing by firms that perform medical tests under
a Medicare reimbursement scheme. There are a
number of flaws in the mechanism established
under the 1986 False Claims Act amendments,
but the statute's bounty mechanism suggests
some interesting possibilities for detecting co-
vert price-fixing arrangements.
Government prosecutors already rely heavily
on insider informants to identify and then pros-
ecute illegal collusion. Informants come forward
for a number of reasons. Sometimes, the impe-
tus is moral outrage on the part of a sales repre-
sentative who notices an arrangement that seems
offensive. Sometimes, the cause is the Justice
Department's leniency program that gives get-
out-of-jail-free cards to the first party in the door.
Sometimes, the inducement is a grant of immu-
nity to otherwise culpable individuals. The use
of leniency, immunity, and other techniques has
been vital to attracting insiders. Without such
informants, the Justice Department's anti-collu-
sion program would be considerably less suc-
cessful.
I propose to bring forward insiders by giving
bounties to those who identify collusion by their
employers. It is a well-established doctrinal prin-
ciple that employees lack standing as private liti-
gants to challenge collusion by their employers,
the theory being that they do not suffer antitrust
injury. If their employers get richer by means of
collusion, the employees profit indirectly by shar-
ing of the spoils of the misconduct. My proposal
is to create a variant of the 1986 False Claims
Act for individuals employed by firms engaged
in collusive schemes. My plan, in short, would
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have the following elements: (1) the written
informer's submission of information about col-
lusion to the Justice Department; (2) a bounty
for the informer-perhaps 15 to 25 percent-
adjustable downward where the informer has
participated in or helped orchestrate the collu-
sive scheme; (3) an anti-retaliation safeguard; (4)
the payment of attorneys fees for individuals who
counsel the relator or informer in this process;
and (5) the allowance of counterclaims by em-
ployers against employee informers who breach
important duties to the firm-for example, an
internal auditor who fails to report episodes of
collusion to top management.
I suggest a 10-year experiment with antitrust
bountyhunting. Since 1986, the government has
recovered about a billion dollars through the
amended Civil False Claims Act bountyhunting
system. About two hundred million dollars of this
amount has been paid out in bounties. I would
begin with a 10-year test to see how it works in
the case of horizontal collusion.
The third item that I would make an ingredi-
ent of a collusion policy for the future is to change
public policies that reinforce the ability of firms
to collude successfully. This morning's panel
pointed out very well the extent to which gov-
ernment policies continue to harm consumers by
facilitating or approving collusion on the part of
private suppliers. As the panel said this morn-
ing, Parker v. Brown (Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1953)) is one of the worst self-inflicted
wounds of American antitrust jurisprudence. It
is striking to those of us who have worked with
foreign governments attempting to make the tran-
sition from communism or socialism to a mar-
ket system to see how much better their new an-
titrust statutes are than our own to the extent that
they make it especially difficult for the state to
avoid liability where it attempts to suppress ri-
valry. Many transition economy antitrust statutes
vest power to grant immunity in the national leg-
islature alone and give no such authority to any
political subdivision below that.
I am going single out one arena in which cur-
rent government policy consistently saws the
government's own legs off. Consider the case of
public procurement. I recently looked through
all of the Justice Department's indictments for a
five-year period extending from the late 1980s
through the early 1990s. Forty percent of the in-
dictments dealt with collusive schemes whose
victims were public purchasing authorities.
To put it in the harshest possible light, public
bodies are the worst suckers, the worst targets,
the worst victims when it comes to horizontal
price fixing. Again and again, the government
as a purchaser is an inflatable punching bag
weighted at the bottom. When struck in the face,
the government tilts over, but quickly comes back
up for another pounding.
What pathologies in the procurement process
facilitate this? A combination of policies put pri-
vate parties in a superior position to collude ef-
fectively. One deals with the observation and
opening of bids. A standard ritual of sealed bid-
ding procurement episodes is the opening of each
bid in a public forum. The bids are opened and
set down on a table in the front of the room, and
all bidders are invited to step forward and take a
look. If you wanted a foolproof mechanism for
detecting cheating on a bid-rigging scheme, you
could do no better than this. Each cartel member
gets to walk forward and say, "Well, Fred said
he was going to bid high this time. Good boy,
Fred, you did," to see if the other bid rotation
participants abided by their promises and to con-
ceive of a punishment mechanism if they did not.
Why do we do this? It results partly from a
compulsion to have absolute integrity in the pro-
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curement process. The idea is that if you do not
have a public display of bids, government pur-
chasing officials would be corrupted to sell their
office to individual bidders. Of course, we could
get the same assurance of integrity by having an
inspector general or some other internal guard-
ian review bids and contract awards. Yet, we con-
tinue to rely upon an open revelation process that
I am convinced has a lot to do with the long-
standing and successful operation of cartels in
the public procurement arena.
A second cartel facilitating policy is the Buy
American Act. Buy American and other local
content measures staple public procurement
policy. These measures restrict competition by
excluding various potential offerors--out-of-
state producers. Such restrictions have the per-
verse effect of limiting entry and stabilizing the
number of participants who can provide the prod-
uct. When you look through past bid-rigging epi-
sodes that the Justice Department has attacked,
it is hard to escape the conclusion that many of
them functioned successfully only because do-
mestic content or local content laws stifled new
entry. They were only a handful of incumbent
producers and having three or four firms to deal
with made the organizing and operating of a car-
tel relatively easy.
The policies described above, and there are a
host of others, serve to reinforce and facilitate
collusion. The government sticks its chin out re-
peatedly in these and other respects and asks pro-
spective cartelists to take a swing. It seems to
me that an important element of reinventing gov-
ernment is to adjust public policies that promote
collusion.
My final suggestion is institutional. Let me
briefly mention three possibilities. First, along
the lines of developing guidelines, I think it
would be extremely helpful to have a document
that does for horizontal restraints and agreement
issues what the DOJ and FTC merger guidelines
have done in the treatment of horizontal merg-
ers. For collusion, one could begin with a basic
economic understanding of what makes a cartel
work effectively and structure the analysis of plus
factors around that understanding. In its airline
pricing case, the Justice Department's competi-
tive impact statement helped it to carefully build
a case around the specific phenomena that make
collusion possible. It would be useful to use a
similar approach to devise guidelines governing
the identification and proof of agreement.
The second possibility is to rely on rule mak-
ing-informal rule making to articulate standards
for defming an agreement and to circumscribe
the use of facilitating practices. Here, I am echo-
ing Jonathan Baker's proposal of three years ago,
that a useful role for the FTC in cases of subtle
interaction and subtle forms of signaling is to
use administrative rule making to identify coor-
dination tactics and to identify conditions in
which the Commission might seek to proscribe
specific behavior. I have not always written fa-
vorably about the FTC's activities and efforts to
extend or refine doctrines in these fields, but I
do think that so long as we have two federal com-
petition policy institutions in this area that it is a
good use of the Commission's time.
Third, even though the FTC's Ethyl case was
not a successful venture, I think it was a respon-
sible exercise of prosecutorial discretion to ad-
dress in facilitation practices in a purely civil
process without treble damages exposure. Al-
though the Commission's experience in Ethyl
was not successful, I think it would be appropri-
ate to come back to that issue in the future as one
focal point for the allocation of the agency's hori-
zontal restraint resources. Thank you.
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Presentation by Ms. Moltenbrey:
I agree with most of Professor Kovacic's re-
marks, but I do have a few comments I want to
make. First, however, let me preface my remarks
by stating that, unlike Richard Epstein, who this
morning was willing to speak as the authorita-
tive voice of the Chicago school, I most defi-
nitely do not speak as the authoritative voice of
the U.S. Department of Justice. The views that I
express here are my own and not those of the
Antitrust Division.
One of the things that I like about Professor
Kovacic's approach to talking about tacit collu-
sion is that he begins by defining his terms. In
particular, he focuses on the terms "tacit collu-
sion" and "circumstantial evidence." I think that
one source of confusion and disagreement in this
area is that courts and commentators tend to use
those terms loosely, as if they were interchange-
able, when in fact they are very different.
I think that we are confronted with three pos-
sible types of agreements when assessing hori-
zontal agreements. The first is the
express agreement that we typically M. j.
think of as the classic criminal cartel. Antitru,
These are usually secret agreements, Civil Tt
but their terms are either written down investig
or spoken or articulated in some way. intellec
Once we find out what was said or agreem
done, it is usually not hard for us to ing chi
decide whether there is an agreement eight y
in such a case. The difficult task is to ture Se
get evidence of what was said or done. chief oj
At the other end, there is the type lege Sc,
of coordination we call "conscious
parallelism." It is well-established in the case law
that, without more, conscious parallelism is not
an agreement within the meaning of the Sherman
Act.
Then, there is the wide range of conduct in
the middle that we call "tacit collusion." In my
mind, tacit collusion occurs when there is no
express agreement, but where there is parallel
behavior plus something else that causes us to
conclude that firms have reached an agreement.
So to me, tacit collusion describes a particular
type of agreement.
On the other hand, when we talk about cir-
cumstantial evidence, we are not really talking
about the substantive standards that define what
constitutes an agreement under the Sherman Act.
Rather, we are talking about how an agreement
is proven - what type of evidence shows that
there is an agreement. I think it is helpful to keep
these distinctions in mind when we talk about
tacit agreements. When we are talking about
roltenbrey is Chief of the Civil Task Force at the
t Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The
'sk Force is responsible for major civil antitrust
'ations and litigation, with special emphasis on
tual property licensing, joint vantures, vertical
ents, and trade association activity. Before becom-
ef of the task force in 1994, Ms. Moltenbrey spent
ears in the Transportation, Energy, and Agricul-
-tion, first as a trial attorney and later as assistant
'the section. She earned her J.D.from Boston Col-
'hool of Law.
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whether there is a tacit agreement that violates
the Sherman Act, we are asking "What is the
conduct?" and "Does that Conduct violate the
law?" And when we talk about circumstantial
evidence, we are talking about how we are go-
ing to prove that a violation occurred.
First though, let me talk a little about express
agreements. Professor Kovacic mentioned two
problems that I think are likely to be a major fo-
cus of the Antitrust Division, and for antitrust
enforcement in general, in the coming years. He
mentioned the continuing prevalence of classic
cartel behavior, as evidenced by the recent Ar-
cher Daniels Midland (ADM) case. (U.S. v. Ar-
cher Daniels Midland Company, 115 S.Ct. 1724
(1995)). Unlike Professor Kovacic, I am not re-
ally surprised that this behavior continues. It is
true that fines, criminal penalties and jail time
have increased recently for these types of crimes,
but it is also true that the benefits that drive these
types of arrangements are enormous and the like-
lihood of getting caught is still slim. While the
risk in terms of the severity of the consequences
of being caught are greater, the risks of getting
caught are not necessarily much greater, and cer-
tainly the incentive to engage in the conduct is
still there.
I think there are two problems that are getting
increasing attention in this area. One is the grow-
ing use and availability of electronic communi-
cations which can contribute to the process of
reaching an express agreement among competi-
tors. A lot of the evidence that we tend to use to
prove the existence of an express agreement
comes from the notes taken, records of phone
calls, and other evidence of meetings or com-
munications. When a substantial amount of com-
munication takes place through computers or
over the Internet, we are concerned that it may
be easier to destroy evidence of these communi-
cations. Records may not be kept long, and it
may become more difficult to develop that type
of evidence. For that reason, we now place a great
deal of emphasis on obtaining access to electroni-
cally stored records through our subpoenas and
civil investigative demands.
The second factor is the increasing interna-
tionalization of competition. The ADM case is a
great example. We have to worry about compa-
nies not only in the U.S., but also overseas, en-
gaging in cartels. Gathering information and evi-
dence in an international context is much more
difficult that obtaining this information domes-
tically, so our job is getting harder in this area.
Again, the Division is focusing much more of
its attention on developing ways to get access to
this information, in part through new agreements
with competition enforcement agencies abroad.
I would also like to comment briefly on Pro-
fessor Kovacic's proposals with respect to these
types of cartels. I find his bounty idea intrigu-
ing, but I think it is important to recognize that
one of the big problems often faced by the Jus-
tice Department in a criminal case is the cred-
ibility of the immunized witness. An immunized
witness' credibility is always subject to attack. I
think that any witness who will come forward to
claim a bounty will probably also want immu-
nity from prosecution, especially if they partici-
pated in the crime. So, in addition to having an
immunized witness who may not be very cred-
ible to a jury, we are going to get a witness who
is going to be paid a lot of money if their testi-
mony results in a conviction. I wonder if this is
really something that would be a benefit for en-
forcement. I think this problem deserves some
additional thought, and the idea intrigues me.
With respect to public procurement, I agree
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with all of Professor Kovacic's comments. It is
an area that the Division has paid attention to in
the past. The Division does counsel federal pro-
curement offices on both how to detect collu-
sion when it is happening and how to set up pro-
grams in ways that will make it less likely to
occur. There are, however, certain constraints in
terms of the openness of government - here, I
am referring to the fact that whether or not bids
are ultimately opened in from of competitors or
some secret place subsequent to submission,
eventually people are going to find out who won
the contract. Concerns about preventing public
corruption as well as government accountability
dictate that. So I question how much a public
opening of bids actually contributes to the prob-
lem.
Now, I am going to turn to the topic of tacit
agreements, which I think is the thrust of this
presentation and in many ways presents the more
difficult conceptual problem. Again, I want to
mention the distinction between a tacit agreement
and circumstantial evidence of an agreement.
Oftentimes, when we are talking about tacit col-
lusion, I think we are dealing with direct evi-
dence of the conduct at issue, not circumstantial
evidence.
Certainly in the airline case, U.S. v. Airline
Tariff Publishing Co., (U.S. v. Airline TariffPub-
lishing Co., 1994WL 454730 (D.D.C.)) the Jus-
tice Department had a very clear idea of what
happened. We knew what the airlines were do-
ing and could prove that conduct through direct
evidence. The question was whether that con-
duct amounted to an agreement under the
Sherman Act. That is the more difficult question.
I do not know whether it is possible to have cir-
cumstantial evidence of tacit agreement. I sup-
pose it is possible. But more likely, and where
the issue of tacit collusion manifests itself, are
situations where the course of events is clear -
where we know exactly what happened -
whether it is the posting of a price in a newspa-
per, a subsequent response by a competitor, and
an alignment of prices at the end - the question
is, can we say there has been a "meeting of the
minds" or a "conscious commitment to a com-
mon scheme?" It is not a question of trying to
infer that certain other conduct must have oc-
curred down the road.
I think that the traditional approach to tacit
collusion, which has been to look at so-called
"plus factors," can be problematic in part because
of this confusion between the notions of "circum-
stantial evidence" and "tacit agreements." Many
of the usual plus factors that courts and commen-
tators list, including the ones that Professor
Kovacic listed, are not necessarily conceptually
relevant to whether or not certain conduct con-
stitutes a tacit agreement. Many of the plus fac-
tors are instead circumstantial evidence of an
express agreement which has been kept secret.
For example, the first factor listed is always
the existence of a rational motive to conspire.
Perhaps it is just my prosecutorial bias, but I tend
to assume that most horizontal competitors have
a rational motive to conspire to raise price. I am
not sure how much that tells you. Next, take
conduct that can only rationally be explained as
the result of concerted action, such as submit-
ting uniform sealed bits-that is certainly relevant
circumstantial evidence of an agreement. But
here again, we are talking about a covert but ex-
press, not tacit, agreement.
Another plus factor cited is the defendant's
participation in past collusion-related events. I
am not sure that I want to rule out the possibility
that recidivism is relevant in tacit collusion cases,
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but it is more clearly and usually thought of as
being relevant to express agreement cases.
That leaves a few plus factors on the table.
One of these is the industry's characteristics. The
economic approach to deciding whether or not
tacit agreements exist leads, as Professor Kovacic
suggests, to an interesting result. By the eco-
nomic approach, I mean looking at what charac-
teristics an industry has and at what it needs to
coordinate firms' behavior. In a tight oligopoly
with the right market characteristics, firms do not
really need to do anything other than engage in
pure conscious parallelism to coordinate their
behavior and raise prices. The closer an industry
gets to a tight oligopoly, the more likely it can
achieve coordination and the less likely it will
need an agreement, tacit or express, in order to
raise prices. On the other hand, the less an in-
dustry has oligopolistic characteristics, the more
difficult it will be through signaling, through
cheap talk, or through other means to monitor
what is going on, the more likely an express
agreement is needed to enable the firms to raise
prices. And I think that is part of the reason that
the smoke-filled room type of cartel agreement
has not disappeared; for some industries, the
smoke filled room is the only way to coordinate.
The "action," when we are talking about tacit
collusion, is in the middle - in industries that
have some of the characteristics that make coor-
dination easier, but not all of them. There are
some hurdles that the firms are going to have to
overcome to engage in coordinated behavior.
This is what we saw in the airline industry.
The industry is characterized by a large number
of frequent transactions, and there is a lot of in-
formation available to rivals about what firms
are doing. There is an almost immediate ability
to detect cheating on any price agreement and
an almost immediate ability for other firms to
respond. These are factors that most economists
would say will make oligopolistic coordination
easier because cheating on the coordinated price
is not likely to be profitable. The industry also
has characteristics that would make it difficult
for the oligopoly to coordinate price. The sheer
volume of information available and the need to
process that information can make it difficult to
monitor what is happening in all of the markets
in which a firm participates. Also, the sheer vol-
ume of information, the number of players, and
the number of markets makes it difficult to pun-
ish cheating.
Professor Kovacic spoke of the oligopolists'
need to reach a consensus, detect cheating, and
punish defectors. The oligopolist must also have
a way to make it clear to the cheater and to the
other competitors that that is what it is doing
when it cuts price to punish the cheater. Igno-
rance about why a firm is cutting price can be
very destabilizing to an oligopoly. The Supreme
Court referred to this problem in the Ligget case-
if you cut prices to punish someone for cheating
on a coordinated price and none of your other
competitors knows why you did it, you are just
going to trigger a price war.
That was one of the problems we saw in the
airline industry that made coordination without
agreement more difficult. In that case, there was
evidence that when firms engaged in punishment
for what they viewed as one airline's deviation
from the agreed upon price, they had developed
mechanisms by which they could attach a sort of
label to what they were doing so that it was clear
to everyone - to the targeted cheater as well as
to others who might see the low fare and wonder
what was going on - that the fare was intended
as punishment for some other airline's fare cut.
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They wanted to be able to explain why a cer-
tain pricing action was being taken, and let oth-
ers know that this was not an invitation to start
a price war - that, in fact, other airlines should
stay out of the skirmish.
One of the most difficult aspects of these types
of tacit collusion cases is finding an appropriate
remedy. I think one of the most useful approaches
to this kind of problem is to look at the process
by which the coordinated price was reached to
see whether there are things that the firms could
have avoided doing. In a pure follow-the-leader
pricing situation, it is difficult to figure out how
the firms could have acted any differently and
still acted the way we expect firms to act - to
pursue the profit maximizing course. However,
in many cases where the Justice Department is
concerned about the exchange of information,
punishment, and complaints between competi-
tors about prices, there are activities going on
that help the firms overcome various obstacles
to coordination and achieve a coordinated out-
come. These activities are necessary to help the
firms reach consensus, police compliance, pun-
ish deviation, and explain their actions. The De-
partment is likely to look at the process by which
coordinated outcomes are reached, and if there
is conduct clearly directed at the process of reach-
ing an agreement and it is conduct that can be
enjoined, then it increases the likelihood that we
will conclude there has been a tacit agreement.
That may in fact be the key distinction between
mere oligopolistic interdependence and tacit
agreement.
And I think that I have probably taken a little
bit more time than I should have, so I am going
to sit down.
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PRESENTATION
Presentation by Mr. Eimer:
Before I got up, Mike Freed was talking to
some of the other panel members and said that
as defense counsel, I probably would sound like
the comedian, Jackie Mason: "I have never seen
tacit collusion. If it exists, I do not know where
it exists. If it does exist, it is not bad, and we
should have more of it."
Tacit collusion does exist, but it exists as col-
lusion. I spend most of my time-in fact, all of
my time counseling corporations about the anti-
trust laws and, to me as an antitrust counselor,
conduct is either collusive or it is not collusive.
There is no real distinction to me between tacit
collusion and collusion. The debate centers
around the directness with which the agreement
or the understanding was reached. I will get to
some of Professor Kovacic's factors in a minute.
I think the ADM situation stunned us all when
it occurred last year. I have been involved in some
of the ADM grand juries, not representing ADM,
thankfully. The interesting thing to me is that all
of the corporations that have pled
guilty so far are foreign companies;
ADM is the only American company. Nathan
This is an interesting commentary on has a su
where we are in antitrust enforcement practic4
in this country. service
I do not believe the type of con- ety of C
duct ADM engaged in is rampant in CivilRi
this country, but it certainly does ex- of law i
ist in the world. I do not believe that He earn
you will routinely find smoke-filled sity an6
rooms occupied with competitors fix- tion in 1
ing prices-if there are smoke-filled
rooms any more. I still find it shocking to view
videotapes of American companies fixing prices.
What ADM did was shocking, and I believe
aberrational. Hopefully, it is unique to the cul-
ture of ADM. I think, however, that M. J.
Moltenbrey is right, that our companies and our
economy are now part of the global economy,
and as that global economy impacts this coun-
try, we are involved. I have seen many circum-
stances where foreign competitors have not a hint
of what an express agreement is or what the con-
straints of our antitrust laws are, and that is an
enormous problem for antitrust enforcement in
this country.
Another problem for antitrust enforcement has
been the merger policy in this country. There is
an increasing concentration of economic wealth
in corporations in various industries in this coun-
try. The idea that Texaco should call up Shell
and decide that they are going to have a joint
venture and market gasoline together is stunning.
Eimer, a partner at Sidley & Austin in Chicago,
bstantial antitrust practice. In addition to his law
e, Mr. Elmer serves as director for several public
organizations including the Infant Welfare Soci-
'hicago and the Chicago Lawyers' Committee for
ghts Under Law, Inc. He is also adjunct professor
n trial advocacy at Northwestern School of Law.
ed his J.D. cum laude from Northwestern Univer-
his A.B. magna cum laude with Highest Distinc-
Tconomics from the University of Illinois.
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Twenty years ago Texaco and Shell would prob-
ably not have been able to merge their refining
and marketing operations.
The concentration of economic power in this
country has lead to the increasing concern about
tacit collusion. As the number of competitors
become fewer and fewer, classic economic theory
tells us that we should worry more about inter-
dependent pricing of one kind or another. We are
slicing the salami thinner and thinner as to what
an agreement is under the Sherman Act and what
should be illegal. We are obviously trying to off-
set the supra-competitive prices that may result
from increasing concentration.
Sentencing guidelines have a dramatic impact
in the corporate board rooms. In my experience,
the efforts by the antitrust authorities and anti-
trust plaintiffs' lawyers and the judgments and
settlements that they have obtained also have had
effect on antitrust compliance. An enormous
amount of time is spent trying to figure out what
employees can and cannot do. An enormous ef-
fort is made to develop internal detection sys-
tems within corporations because of the sentenc-
ing guidelines. Appropriate compliance programs
can provide a reduction in sentencing if the cor-
poration is ever found to have engaged in price
fixing.
I think that Professor Kovacic's proposals are
interesting, but I am not sure that ultimately that
is the kind of society we want. What limits those
proposals to antitrust laws and antitrust enforce-
ment? I could imagine that you could have
whistleblowers in all phases of life, but that is a
world that I would not want to be involved in. I
do believe that vigorous enforcement from the
outside and the pressure on corporations to self-
police are important deterrents to price fixing.
I want to address Professor Kovacic's three-
part test for tacit collusion because I think when
you get past the first point, the test really im-
plodes on itself. If competition reaches a con-
sensus then, I would say, even as a defense law-
yer, we have an illegal agreement. I do not need
the other two factors-the only question is, "Has
a consensus been reached?" If a consensus has
been reached among competitors, I would be
quite concerned, if I were their lawyer, as to
where they were headed. The real question is,
"What does it mean to reach a consensus?" This
is another way of asking, "What does it mean to
say have you reached an agreement?"
An agreement is unquestionably hard to de-
fine. The courts have struggled with it; we, as
counsel, have struggled with it, you as counsel
and judges have struggled with it. It is not clear
and it cannot be clear. It stems back to the premise
of our economy-profit maximization through
competition. If we are going to allow companies
and managers to maximize profits and, therefore,
prices, to the extent they independently do so,
then at what point can you constrain their con-
duct? At what point, will we say, "You can't do
that?" You know the phrase 'the wink of an eye
is enough to have an agreement established.'
Okay. Fine. A wink of an eye. But how about an
E-mail? How about a certain price posting sys-
tem in a periodical? How about a bulletin board
where prices get posted? How about a thousand
different things that people can think of over
time? If it results in a consensus in which people
acknowledge that the pricing level is acceptable,
then, through a wink of an eye or an agreement
or a consensus, however you define it, it is ille-
gal. This is the end of the analysis.
If, instead, there is independent conduct with
the realization that there is going to be a response
from a competitor and an expectation based on
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game theory what the response will be in terms
of a counter measure, then that to me ought not
be illegal conduct so long as we are going to al-
low people to maximize profits-and it seems to
me that is very much where we have been.
I think there is-and I think Professor Kovacic's
suggested this indirectly-more room within Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for
increased enforcement. The FTC has experi-
mented with it in the past, and three or four years
ago, they tried to bring some cases which resulted
in a consent order. They went after people who
have solicited a conspiracy without successfully
doing so. There is more room in Section 5 to deal
with issues of tacit collusion; it would be inter-
esting to see where the FTC could go. I do be-
lieve on balance, however, the courts have done
an extraordinarily good job in dealing with this.
I think the Matsushita (Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986)) doctrine of requiring the court to
eliminate from consideration conduct which is
consistent with rational business judgment is a
correct view of the law.
Most of what occurs, ultimately goes on in
front of a jury, if it ever goes to a jury. What the
courts are trying to do is merely decide on the
standard for summary judgment. If defense coun-
sel loses summary judgment, that doesn't mean
that the conduct is illegal. It means merely that
the conduct is going to a jury for a decision. It is
up to the jury to decide whether or not the con-
duct is an "agreement" under the Sherman Act.
The definitions that we have been using here to-
day are really summary judgment standards, for
the most part, not ultimate decision standards,
and I think it makes a real difference in thinking
about antitrust policies to keep that in mind.
Thank you.
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QUESTION & ANSWER
Mr. Freed: Because there appears to
be substantial agreement on many important is-
sues and because we are running a little past the
earlier projected time, I would propose that we
not get into a rebuttal between and amongst the
panelists, but instead open it up to questions from
the floor, if anybody has a question concerning
any of the remarks which have been made.
Q: Mr. Eimer spoke of extraterritorial appli-
cation. I know that is the next topic. I would like
to get his view and perhaps the former justice's
view on the GE IndustrialDiamond case. Was it
not that failure to win their base margin on the
fact there must be activity happening overseas?
Ms. Moltenbrey: i expect that
there are a number of issues that the judge was
looking at, not the least of which was the nature
of the evidence, which was complex. I am not
sure that the international aspect of it in and of
itself was a major factor.
Mr. Eimer: I agree. My understand-
ing of the case, and I was not involved in it, is
that there was a failure of proof or failure of evi-
dence-had there been sufficient evidence or had
a witness been available; maybe what you are
referring to is ability to get sufficient evidence
from overseas and competitors, to that extent,
then answer is yes. It is clearly an antitrust en-
forcement problem right now. There is no ques-
tion about that.
Q: Do you think that the fact that meetings
and agreements may have taken place overseas
is not itself a variant?
MIr. Eimer: Where the meeting takes
place-I do not mean to speak for the Justice De-
partment, but as a defense counsel-I would not
counsel my client to be very comfortable com-
mitting a conspiracy in England that would im-
pact the United States. I do not think that is that
an issue. I think the issue is if there are witnesses
in England that are beyond the subpoena power
of American courts, can the Justice Department
prove the agreement here? That is a real prob-
lem for the government, but not one I would seek
much comfort in as defense counsel.
Ms. Moltenbrey: I would agree
with that.
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U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE
GLOBAL MARKET: NATIONAL AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT
Growing political sentiment combined with legislative
proposals favoring the elimination of international trade
barriers raise the concern of whether the present state of
transnational antitrust enforcement is capable of reaching
conduct traditionally condemned in the United States. Do
the benefits of free international trade currently outweigh
the risks? How do we keep trade "free?"
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